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Abstract
We use a Chinese rm-director level panel dataset to examine the matching of
heterogeneous rms and politicians. Based on 36,308 detailed biographies, we iden-
tify individuals that previously held bureaucratic positions and classify the rank of
each position in the Chinese political hierarchy. Using this direct measure of po-
litical capital, we examine how rms with heterogeneous productivity match with
politicians with di¤erent political strength. Our results indicate a positive assorta-
tive matching in the political markets. More productive rms recruit more powerful
politicians. Further, the preference for political capital relative to conventional hu-
man capital increases in rmsdependence on external nancing and decreases in the
e¢ ciency of local governments. Conditional on the endogenous matching, new hires
with greater political strength receive more compensation than their co-workers in
the same cohort. The marginal e¤ect of a one-step rise in the political ladder exceeds
the marginal e¤ect of raising education attainment from, for example, high school
to college.
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1 Introduction
The soaring of Chinas economy in the past decades has drawn increasing attention to its political
system. In contrast to its unprecedented economic growth, Chinas political liberalization is far
less profound. The highly closed political regime continues to rule while the country embraces
economic integration. This discrepancy grants new economic values to political capital as
rent-seeking activities move from an autarkic environment to a fast-growing open economy.
A large number of studies have shown that political connections play an important role
in rmseconomic performance around the world.1 Existing evidence suggests that political
connections help rms secure favorable regulatory conditions, gain access to resources, and
receive preferential treatment in legal system. These "benets" are not exclusive to one nation.
They have been identied in both developed and developing countries, including the United
States, Brazil, Malaysia, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, and China.
In this paper, we take a step back from the conventional focus on evaluating the ex-post e¤ect
of political connections and examine instead the endogenous decision of rms to invest in political
capital. We investigate how the di¤erential decisions of rms to engage in political investment
lead to an assortative matching between rms with heterogeneous physical productivity and
politicians with heterogeneous ability. Our analysis contributes to the existing literature by
addressing the assignment in political markets, an issue that has received little attention in the
past, and comparing that with the assignment in traditional labor markets. Taking into account
this endogenous assignment, we identify the price of political capital relative to conventional
human capital and evaluate the magnitude of political premium.
Understanding the matching of rms and political capital is important for a number of
reasons. First, it helps establish the causal e¤ect of political connections on rm performance.
When there is a systematic relationship between rm productivity and the decision to build
political connections, estimating the e¤ect of political connections without taking into account
the above relationship is likely to bias the result. Second, a rapidly expanding literature
in international economics, led by Melitz (2003), Bernard and Jensen (1999), Helpman et al.
(2004) and Eaton et al. (2008), has noted that rm heterogeneity plays an important role in
explaining rmsentry and exit decision in domestic and international markets. Our analysis, by
introducing additional dimensions of heterogeneity in factor markets, complements the above
literature and helps identify potential sources of rm heterogeneity. Finally, whether there
is positive or negative assortative matching conveys broad implications for the e¢ ciency of
matching and, moreover, rm dispersion. Dependent on the direction of assortative matching,
political investment can either widen or contract rm divergence in performance.
The institutional environment of China provides a natural context for studying the matching
of rms and political capital. First, unlike democratic economies where campaign contributions
1We discuss the literature in greater detail below.
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serve as a main channel to invest in politics,2 business entities in China rely on building personal
connections (known as "guanxi") with governments. Hiring former politicians with attractive
political background is an approach that has often been adopted (Li, 1998). Second, unlike
bribery an alternative channel of political investment, recruiting politicians is legitimate under
the rule of law. This means that it is possible to systematically quantify the latter type of
interaction between rms and politicians. Third, the Chinese political system features a clear
political hierarchy where the political power of each level of politicians is strictly ordinal. This
gives us an objective measure of each politicians political strength  and subsequently ability
to contribute to each rm through his/her political background. Given these characteristics,
examining the politician employment of Chinese rms o¤ers us a unique channel to study the
matching in political markets.
We use a Chinese rm-director level panel dataset to undertake the tasks.3 The dataset
reports a detailed biography for each individual (in total 36,308 individuals and 89,608 obser-
vations). The biography describes in detail each persons education level and previous work
experience. We examine each biography and identify all the political positions previously held
by each individual. We then match each position to the Chinese political hierarchy (Section
3) and classify its corresponding rank.4 Our statistics show that more than 35 percent of the
non-state controlled companies have politicians in their director team. These politicians di¤er
considerably in the rank of their political positions. As of 2007, 73 percent of them were former
o¢ cials of local city governments whereas 19 percent held the positions of provincial governor
or the equivalent.
The dataset exhibits several features that are essential for studying political-market match-
ing. First, as mentioned above the data allows us to treat political capital as a heterogeneous
factor. Instead of using an indicator variable as in many earlier contributions (such as com-
munist party membership in Li et al., 2008), we di¤erentiate the rank of political positions held
by each individual. We also control for the scope of each persons political connections using
the number of previously held political jobs. These variables give us alternative measures of
political strength that varies across individuals. Second, the data permits us to account for
conventional human capital. It reports the education level and professional qualication of
each individual. This information allows us to examine rmspreference between political and
conventional human capital and compare the matching with politicians to the matching with
traditional labor. It also helps address the potential correlation between political accomplish-
ment and education/professional attainment and estimate the relative price of political capital.
2See Stratmann (2005) for a review of studies on political campaigns.
3 The data includes the population of Chinese publicly listed companies in the period of 2004-2007 with the
exclusion of enterprises whose corporate governance is subject to government intervention. See Section 5 for
more details of the data.
4There were two challenges in constructing the data. First, the original biography information was presented
in a descriptive format. This required extracting each individuals previous positions manually from the text.
Second, mapping each position to the political hierarchy was a complex process given the vast Chinese political
system.
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Finally, the panel nature of the data is useful for establishing the causality between rm pro-
ductivity and matching decision. We identify the new hires of each company in each year and
examine how rmsphysical productivity and performance in a lagged period a¤ect their future
matches with politicians. The rm-director structure of data also makes it possible to evaluate
the price premium of political capital within each rm with the use of rm-year xed e¤ect and
isolate the e¤ect of unobserved factors.
We proceed by rst considering a simple matching model as a guide to the empirical analysis.
We build on the vast literature of matching theory led by Roy (1950) and Tinbergen (1951) and
explore how the matching theory, traditionally applied to labor and marriage markets, can help
explain the assignment between rms and politicians. We consider a continuum of rms, each
characterized by a distinct "physical" productivity (determined by, e.g., the e¢ ciency of physical
capital), and two types of human capital, both heterogeneous in ability. The rst type consists
of a continuum of conventional labor and the other a continuum of politicians. Politicians di¤er
in their political strength and thus the ability to contribute to each rm through their political
background, knowledge and network. We assume that rm physical productivity and the two
types of human capital abilities are complementary in production.
The model yields three intuitive hypotheses. First is what we label as the positive assor-
tative matching hypothesis, which predicts that more productive rms will be matched with
more capable human capital, including both conventional labor and politicians. The second
hypothesis concerns the ability ratio of political and conventional human capital. The ratio is
predicted to increase in rm productivity when the politician markets are less dispersed than
the conventional labor markets and in the relative importance of political capital ability in pro-
duction function. Finally, we obtain a pay ratio hypothesis: the pay ratio of politicians relative
to conventional labor is higher when the relative importance of political capital is larger.
The empirical evidence is broadly consistent with these predictions. We nd that more
productive rms are signicantly more likely to have politically endowed individuals on board
than their less e¢ cient competitors. They also tend to match with politicians from the higher
levels of hierarchy, as expected from the rst hypothesis. While a similar matching also applies
to conventional human capital ability, more productive rms exhibit a stronger preference for
capable politicians as opposed to capable non-political labor. This is especially true when
rms are dependent on external nancing, suggesting that the importance of political capital
increases in rmsreliance on credit access. The preference for politicians is also stronger when
rms are located in cities with lower government e¢ ciency where the value of political capital
is likely greater. Controlling for endogenous matching and individual characteristics such as
education and professional qualication, directors with political endowment receive signicantly
more compensation than their co-workers, as expected from the pay ratio hypothesis. The
political premium increases in the level of political rank and is greater in industries and locations
where political capital exerts a larger value. A one-step rise in the political ladder from municipal
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to provincial level leads to 12 percent more pay. Conventional human capital, on the other hand,
appears to a¤ect the compensation of existing directors mainly.
We argue that our results o¤er evidence of positive assortative matching where a match is
mutually benecial to rms and politicians rather than alternative explanations such as extortion
by politicians. The latter interpretation would assume that rms do not derive any benets from
political connections and the match is determined alone by politiciansself imposition. This
interpretation is unlikely given the institutional environment in China where the direct inuence
of government o¢ cials on non-state controlled businesses has diminished substantially in the past
decades. It is also inconsistent with our nding that rms with greater potential demand for
political capital (because of, e.g., larger nancial constraints) have a stronger preference for
politicians. This nding would not arise if rms would not derive any value from political
capital and it is only politicians that extract rents from the most protable rms.
The assortative matching remains robust when we address the potential endogeneity of
productivity using an instrumental variable (IV) approach in which the average productivities
of upstream and downstream rms located in the same province are employed as identifying
instruments. The choice of these two IVs is motivated by the growing literature on productivity
spillover between vertically linked industries. We construct the variables based on a large
population of public and private rms to mitigate sample selection.5 Our results indicate that
correcting for the potential endogeneity of rm e¢ ciency does not change the positive matching
between productive rms and capable politicians.
Our paper is closely related to the growing literature that examines the e¤ect of political
connections on rm performance. Empirical evidence in this literature shows that political
connections help rms secure favorable regulatory conditions (Agrawal and Knoeber, 2001) and
obtain preferential access to resources such as bank loans (Khwaja and Mian, 2005; Claessens
et al., 2008). It also suggests that political connections can help raise the market value of rms
(Roberts, 1990; Fisman, 2001; Ramalho, 2007) and improve their economic performance (John-
son and Mitton, 2003). These results are not exclusive to one nation; they have been identied
in both industrial and emerging economies including the U.S. (Snyder, 1990; Agrawal and Knoe-
ber, 2001), Brazil (Ramalho, 2007; Claessens et al., 2008), Indonesia (Fisman, 2001), Malaysia
(Johnson and Mitton, 2003) and Pakistan (Khwaja and Mian, 2005). Faccio (2005) provides a
unique cross-country comparison of politically connected rms. Several studies provide related
evidence based on Chinese rm-level data.6 Li et al. (2008), for example, investigate the rela-
tionship between communist party membership and protability of Chinese private rms. They
nd that being a¢ liated to the communist party has a positive e¤ect on rmsaccess to bank
loans and condence in the legal system, the former of which is similarly shown in Bai et al.
5Note the director information is not available for private rms, which dictated the use of
public rms in the main analysis.
6Haggard and Huang (2008) provide an excellent survey on the political economy of private-sector development
in China.
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(2005).7 Du and Girma (2007) examine the e¤ect of political a¢ liation on rmssurvival and
growth prospects. Their results indicate a robust positive relationship. This paper di¤ers from
these studies by examining the endogenous decision of rms to invest in political capital. In-
stead of treating rmspolitical connections as an exogenous endowment, we examine how rms
with heterogeneous productivity and other characteristics such as external nance dependence
vary in their political investment decisions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we discuss Chinas economic and
bureaucratic reforms during the transition period and how they a¤ect the interaction between
economy and bureaucracy. We then describe in Section 3 the structure of political hierarchy in
China. In section 4, we build a simple matching model as a prelude to the empirical analysis
and derive three main hypotheses. We describe the data and variable construction in Section 5.
In Section 6, we estimate the matching mechanism underlying rms and politicians. In Section
7, we examine the price of political capital in comparison to conventional human capital. The
paper concludes in section 8.
2 The Interaction of Economy and Bureaucracy in China
In the past three decades, China undertook a dramatic transition from a planned economy to
a market-oriented economy. At the same time as this transition, several major reforms were
implemented in the bureaucratic system. These economic and bureaucratic transitions have
transformed the political incentives of Chinese rms and the economic incentives of Chinese
politicians. In this section, we provide a brief overview of the transformations.
2.1 The economic transition
At the outset of Chinas reforms in 1978, the state controlled virtually all aspects of the economy.
Since that time, China initiated a long sequence of economic restructuring by granting market
forces a central role in determining the prices of goods, services and factors. This process is
marked by two interrelated phenomena: the sharp decline of state-owned enterprises (SOEs)
and the explosion of privately-controlled industrial activities.
As China started introducing market reforms, SOEs that were historically dependent on
government protection and subsidies faced the dual challenge of increasing market competition
and decreasing scal support. Enterprises that had been idle before the reforms were quickly
crowded out of the markets. According to the Chinese Industry Census data, the output share
of state-owned enterprises plunged from 81 percent in 1980 to 15 percent in 2005. The number
7While most existing studies nd political connections have a positive e¤ect on rm performance, there is also
evidence of negative inuence. Fan et al. (2007), for example, show that politically connected CEOs can have an
adverse impact on the post-IPO performance of newly privatized Chinese state-owned enterprises. The rationale
there is that during the early privatization process political connections represent government intervention whose
interests often di¤er from asset value and prot maximization.
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of SOEs dropped by more than 90%. The remaining enterprises were forced to undertake drastic
restructuring including a partial privatization process initiated in 1993 when the Company Law
was adopted. This process greatly diversied the corporate ownership of SOEs and transformed
the role of government to the role of a shareholder.8 The process did not, however, eliminate
government intervention in the remaining state-controlled rms. For example, the hiring deci-
sion of top executives in these rms continues to be partially or even completely interfered by
the government.9
Given the primary interest of this paper is to examine the endogenous matching between
rms and politicians, we exclude enterprises whose shareholders include government entities
at either central or local level. We focus instead on companies that are under little direct
government inuence and enjoy autonomy in their corporate governance. These include largely
privatized former SOEs and privately owned businesses  a group that experienced a remarkable
growth in the economic transition.
The 2005 Census data shows that 85 percent of industrial output came from non-state-owned
rms and rms with partial or full foreign ownership. This gure represents a substantial
increase in the weight of private sectors compared to 1980 when non-state-controlled activities
constituted 20 percent of the entire economy. Another indicator is the growth of investment
by private businesses: As of 2003 more than 60 percent of xed-asset investment was initiated
by non-state-owned rms (Haggard and Huang, 2008). These rms also play an increasingly
important role in Chinas participation in international markets, contributing to the countrys
rapid growth in trade and foreign investments.
However, all these transitions started in an environment where most important elements
characterizing a sound institutional infrastructure, e.g., well-structured legal system, rigorous
law enforcement, clearly-dened property rights, well-functioning nancial markets, were still
missing. The institutional constraints pose a direct impact on individual companiesperfor-
mance and, consequently, corporate decisions targeted to improve rmsrelative competitive-
ness. For example, many studies such as Perkins and Rawski (2008) point out that the private
sector in China faces severe challenges in the nancing of capital formation. According to a
cross-country survey collected by Batra et al. (2002), the nancial constraints facing Chinese
entrepreneurs are similar to those prevailing in other transitional economies such as Croatia,
Czech Republic and Romania and in poor economies such as Ghana and Ethiopia. Bank loans,
8State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) was established in 2003 to carry
out the governments functions as investor and owner of state assets. The main responsibilities of SASAC include
approving mergers and acquisitions, authorizing sale of stocks and assets, and appointing top executives. As of
April 2009, SASAC of the State Council oversees 138 centrally controlled state enterprises, including Chinas
large petroleum, petrochemical, electricity, automobile, and telecom enterprises. This number steadily decreased
compared to 2003 as a result of a state-pushed drive to restructure and streamline the group (China Daily, July
21 2007).
9There is however survey data such as the Shanghai Stock Exchange poll indicating a growing tendency of
state-owned enterprises to pursue commercial interests and increasing autonomy given to SOE managers. This
is attributed partly to the prot-seeking focus of SASAC and the continuing o¤ering of public shares.
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share o¤erings, and bond issues continue to ow mainly to state-controlled entities. This o¤ers
a strong incentive for rms to form ties with government. As described in the introduction,
existing evidence (e.g., Bai et al., 2005; Li et al., 2008) show that political connections can help
rms secure access to bank loans and obtain favorable loan terms. One e¤ective channel to
form political connections in China is to recruit politicians.
Raising external capital is not the only way politicians can contribute. Most rm operations
involving government licensing such as real estate development, raw material procurement, gov-
ernment contract, and export/import can potentially benet from political connections (Dickson,
2003). In addition to the above, politicians can also improve e¢ ciency in dealing with govern-
ment agencies and o¤er their regulatory and bureaucratic knowledge. We discuss next how the
bureaucratic reforms in the past thirty years provided an opportunity for a growing interaction
between businesses and government o¢ cials.
2.2 The bureaucratic reforms
Despite the lack of political liberalization, China has gone through a major transformation of its
bureaucratic system. This transformation started in 1980 and consisted of three major reforms:
the initiation of a mandatory retirement program, the granting of permission to bureaucrats
to quit government positions and join businesses, and the decentralization of administrative
responsibilities (Li, 1998).
The rst reform addressed the promotion and retirement policy of bureaucrats. It was
initiated by Deng Xiaoping in 1980 and aimed to "abolish the de facto lifetime tenure system of
government o¢ cials". The reform introduced strict retirement ages for government o¢ cials and
initiated a massive mandatory retirement program. It also o¤ered a one-time buyout strategy
to compensate outgoing o¢ cials both economically and politically. As expected, this reform
signicantly decreased the average retirement age and tenure of bureaucrats. According to the
Chronicle of Contemporary Chinese Politics (1996), the average retirement age fell from 62 to
55 for provincial governors, from 64 to 58 for ministers, and from 58 to 50 for city mayors.10
The average tenure per position decreased from 6.4 to 3.8 at the provincial governor level and
from 6.6 to 4.4 at the minister level.
The second major reform is closely related to the rst and was introduced in the mid-
1980s when bureaucrats were allowed to quit their government positions and join businesses,
a phenomenon later known as xiahai ("leaping into the sea"). This was accompanied by the
governments substantial e¤orts to downsize its agencies. Both of these measures, along with
the mandatory retirement and buyout program, led to a large supply of former government
o¢ cials who are motivated to join the business community to pursue higher economic returns.
This was documented in a 1995 survey of local government o¢ cials (State Commission of System
10The mandatory retirement age is 65 for provincial governors and ministers, 60 for city mayors or department
chiefs, and 55 for county sheri¤s and division chiefs.
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Reform, 1996): close to 20 percent of interviewed o¢ cials were planning on xiahai. Of those,
35 percent were looking for joint-venture enterprises, 21 percent for private enterprises, and 15
percent for SOEs. A large number of bureaucrats also sought to found their own businesses
and become private entrepreneurs.
The third reform is the administrative decentralization initiated in the mid 1980s. During
the decentralization, considerable power and autonomy, including the authority to appoint sub-
ordinate government o¢ cials and to set economic regulations, was granted to local (provincial
and municipal) governments. According to Naughton (2008), local authorities in China today
enjoy more autonomy than their counterparts in some former socialist countries (for example, the
Soviet Union) or even democracies (for instance, India). Prominent examples include Guang-
dong and Zhejiang, two coastal provinces where o¢ cials have a large scope of discretion in setting
economic policies. This gave businesses increasing incentives to build connections with local
politicians. These politicians contribute their institutional knowledge, political background and
network. In return, they become shareholders and managers.
3 An Overview of the Political Hierarchy
Before presenting our theoretical and econometric analysis, we discuss in this section the struc-
ture of Chinese political hierarchy. The political system in China features a strictly ordinal
power structure. Politicians from a higher level of the political hierarchy oversee and possess
more bureaucratic power than their subordinates. Once we classify the rank of each politician
in the hierarchy it will be relatively straightforward to quantify the politicians relative political
strength. In this section, we describe in detail the organizational structure of Chinese political
system (Table A.1 presents a summary). We start with the central government and then move
to local governments.
3.1 Central government
The central government at the national level is composed of the National Peoples Congress
(NPC), President, the Central Military Commission, and the State Council. The National
Peoples Congress is the highest state legislative body under the Constitution of the Peoples
Republic of China. At the annual plenary sessions, delegates review and approve new policies,
laws and other important legislative and personnel changes proposed by the Communist Party
of China or the State Council. Delegates of the NPC are elected from military and provincial
Peoples Congresses, which are in turn elected from lower level congresses. The Chairman of the
NPC Standing Committee is the top legislator in China and conventionally ranked third among
top leaders, after the General Party Secretary and the President.
The President of China is elected by the NPC. Based upon the decisions made by the NPC
and its standing committee, the President announces new laws, personnel changes and other
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important political decisions.
The Central Military Commission leads the entire armed force in China. It includes the
Chairman, Vice-Chairmen and several members (two Vice-Chairmen and eight members as of
year 2008). The Chairman is elected by the NPC. The other members are nominated by the
Chairman and approved by the NPC and its standing committee.
The State Council is the highest executive body of state power and highest administrative
body of state. The State Council includes the Premier, vice-Premiers, State Councilors, and
ministers of ministries and commissions. The Premier is nominated by the President and ap-
proved by the NPC. The other members of the State Council are nominated by Premier and
reviewed by the NPC or its standing committee. There are 27 ministries and commissions in
the State Council (e.g. Ministry of Foreign A¤airs). Under the ministries and commissions,
there are 22 administrations and bureaus such as National Bureau of Energy and State Food
and Drug Administration.
3.2 Local governments
Local governments in China can be ranked at four levels. They include, from high to low,
province, prefecture or municipality, county and township.11 The higher-level government over-
sees and has administrative responsibilities over the lower-level governments. There are two
top o¢ cials at each local level government. One is the Party Secretary who represents the
Communist Party of China and is in charge of policy making. This gure is appointed by the
superiors. The other is the head of the local government (governor, mayor or magistrate for
di¤erent levels) who engages in policy making and is, in theory, elected by the people. The gov-
ernments in China have a dual position system, which means that any higher level government
has corresponding positions for the lower level government. Hence, a provincial government is
composed of several departments and each of these departments is ranked the same as the lower
level government, i.e. the municipal government.
Provinces are the highest level of local governments. As of today, excluding Taiwan, Hong
Kong and Macau, China has 31 provincial units  4 centrally administrated cities (Beijing,
Shanghai, Tianjing and Chongqing), 22 provinces and 5 autonomous regions. A province ranks
at the same level as a ministry in the central government. There are three level of cities
in China, namely municipalities, prefecture-level cities, and county-level cities. Sub-provincial
cities are prefecture-level, and sub-prefecture-level cities are county-level. By the end of 2005,
China had more than 660 cities. Counties are found in the third level of the local governments,
whose number is more than 1400. Township is the lowest level of local government and exists
in smaller rural areas.
11There are four municipalities, Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai and Chongqing, that are treated and ranked the
same as provinces.
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3.3 The hierarchy of Chinese politicians
Following the hierarchy of central and local governments, government o¢ cials are ranked at four
levels in China. Generally speaking, o¢ cials of a higher-level government are ranked higher in
the political hierarchy and have more political power than those at the lower levels.
Except the central party and state leaders at the national level, i.e., President, Premier and
other top leaders, the highest ranked political position is "Bu". Provincial leaders (i.e., the
provincial party secretary and governor) and ministers of State Council ministries and commis-
sions are ranked at this level. The next rank is "Ting", which includes municipal-level positions
(such as mayors) and department heads of government bureaus.12 The third rank is "Chu"
and includes county-level positions and directors of government divisions. The lowest rank is
"Ke"; government o¢ cials at township level and section chiefs of government bureaus are at this
level. In the Chinese political system, o¢ cials at the rank of "Bu" or "Ting" are considered as
high-level o¢ cials.
In 1984, China replaced the two-rank down system with a one-rank down system as part
of the decentralization. This means that, for example, the Central Committee only managed
directly leaders at ministerial and provincial level. The decentralization greatly reduced the
number of cadres directly managed by the Central Committee and enabled provincial leaders to
gain almost complete control over appointments and dismissals of o¢ cials within their territorial
jurisdiction. As a result of the 1984 reform, local governments, especially at the provincial level,
revolved from an agent of the central government to governments with considerable resources
and autonomy.
4 Theoretical Framework
As a prelude to the empirical investigation, we employ a simple matching model in this section
to o¤er intuition to the sorting mechanism between rms and politicians. We build on the vast
literature of matching theory led by Roy (1950) and Tinbergen (1951) and explore in this paper
how the matching theory, traditionally applied to labor markets, marriage markets, local public
nance and organization design, can also help explain the assignment in political markets.13
4.1 Basic setup
The economy consists of two sectors, one of which produces a homogeneous product and the
other di¤erentiated products. Consumers have a CES sub-utility function for the di¤erentiated
12 In some highly ranked municipalities, e.g., Nanjing, mayor tends to be ranked half a rank above his/her
counterparts of other municipalities and the same as deputy minister.
13Given the main focus of this paper on the sorting of rms and politicians, we adopt a frictionless matching
framework and abstract from some of the more complex features of matching models such as search cost and
moral hazard problem in producing the match output. See Legros and Newman (2002) for theoretical work in
this area.
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good given by
U =
" R
i2

q(i)di
# 1

; 0 <  < 1 (1)
where q(i) represents the consumption quantity of variety i, 
 the set of varieties available and
 the elasticity of substitution between varieties. Given this utility function, the equilibrium
revenue of a rm is
r(i) = p(i)q(i) = Aq(i); (2)
where p(i) is the price of the variety i, A  E= Ri2
 p(i) =(1 )di1 , and E is the countrys
total spending on the di¤erentiated product.
There is a continuum of rms in the di¤erentiated product sector. Each rm draws a distinct
"physical" productivity , representing, for example, the e¢ ciency of physical capital and the
level of endowed technology, from a distribution function F (). Following Melitz (2003), we
assume  follows a Pareto distribution, i.e., F () = 1  (=)z where  > > 0 and z > 1. From
now onwards we suppress i and use  to index rms.
There are two types of human capital; one consists of a continuum of "conventional" labor
(denoted as l) and the other a continuum of politicians (denoted as g). Both types of human
capital are heterogeneous in ability, which we denote as al and ag respectively. Specically,
we dene the political ability ag as a representation of the strength of political connections,
the level of regulatory knowledge and the access to government resources.14 The distribution
functions of the two types of human capital abilities are given by Hl(al) = 1   (al=al)kl and
Hg(ag) = 1  (ag=ag)kg where al > al > 1, ag > ag > 1, and kl; kg > 1.15
Each rm employs a unit of human capital from either the conventional labor market or the
politician market or both. We assume that output of each rm (y) depends on the physical
productivity of the rm (), the conventional human capital ability (al), and the political capital
ability (ag):
y = ala

g (3)
where  > 0 represents the marginal rate of technical substitution between political and conven-
tional labor ability when al = ag, and can vary, for example, across industries. This production
technology assumes that there exists complementarity between rm physical productivity and
human capital abilities. Put di¤erently, the marginal benet of labor abilities, including both
al and ag, increases in rm physical e¢ ciency and vice versa.16
14Alternatively, we can interpret al and ag as two characteristics of labor. Each unit of labor draws a conven-
tional human capital ability from the distribution function Hl(al) and a political ability from Hg(ag). The two
characteristics are independent of each other as consistent with the evidence reported in Table A.3 of Section 5.
15The assumption of Pareto distribution is plausible for the politician market given the structure of Chinese
political hierarchy. There are more than 1,400 counties in China, over 600 cities and 31 provincial units. This
means that the number of politicians decreases exponentially as the political rank rises.
16An alternative assumption is that there exists a substituting relationship between rm e¢ ciency and labor
abilities. This would reverse the matching mechanism we identify below. We present here the case of com-
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Finally, we use wl(al) and wg(ag) to denote the pay rates o¤ered by the rm to conventional
labor and politicians, respectively. We assume that the pay is commensurate with the ability
levels of the individuals in the following functional forms: wl(al)  lall =l and wg(ag) 
ga
g
g =g where l; g > 0 and l; g > 1.
4.2 Competitive matching
Given wl(al) and wl(al), the prot maximization problem of each rm can be written as:
() = max
al;ag
fr()  wl(al)  wg(ag)g ; (4)
where r() = A(ala

g ). The rst-order conditions for the two human capital abilities are:

l
r()
1=l
= al()

g
r()
1=g
= ag(): (5)
These conditions imply that rms with a larger revenue are matched with more capable conven-
tional labor and politicians.
Using the rst-order conditions, we can solve explicitly for human capital abilities as a
function of rm physical productivity. This yields:
al() =

A
l
g="l
g
="
ag() =

A
l
l="l
g
(l )="
(6)
where "  lg   (l + g).17
4.3 Human capital market clearing
To complete the discussion, we discuss in this sub-section the pay rate functions, i.e., wl(al) and
wg(ag), characterized at the human capital market equilibrium. For the human capital market
to clear at each ability level, we need, for any , that the number of rms with productivity
higher than  equals the amount of labor allocated to these rms:
1R

dF (v) =
1R
al()
dHl(v) and
1R

dF (v) =
1R
ag()
dHg(v): (7)
plementarity since its corresponding sorting hypothesis is the sorting mechanism supported by the empirical
evidence.
17Section 4.3 indicates that " > 0.
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Given equations (6), the above conditions imply that
l = 

1 + klz + 
kl
kg

l = A

 a
=kl kl=z
l

g =
kg
kl

1 + klz + 
kl
kg

g = A

ag
al
l=kl 
 a
=kl kl=z
l

:
(8)
4.4 Hypotheses
Now we outline the main hypotheses for the empirical analysis. Inspecting equations (6) leads
to the rst hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1 (Positive Assortative Matching): There exists a positive assortative match-
ing between rm physical e¢ ciency  and labor abilities al and ag.
In other words, high-productivity rms are matched with high-ability conventional labor
and politicians. This prediction is a direct result of complementarity between rm physical
e¢ ciency and human capital ability, also known as the "supermodularity" condition in the
matching literature. The literature has noted supermodularity as a su¢ cient condition for
positive assortative matching.
Given equations (6), we can also obtain the ratio of political and conventional labor abilities:
ag()
al()
=

A
l
(l g)="l
g
(l  )="
; (9)
where the market-clearing l, g, l and g are given in (8). This gives us our next hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2 (Ability Ratio): The ability ratio ag()=al() increases in  when kg < kl and
.
This hypothesis suggests that when the conventional labor market is more dispersed than
the politician market, more productive rms not only are matched with more capable politicians
but also exhibit a stronger relative preference for political ability. The latter is also true when
, which captures the relative importance of political capital ability, is larger.
Now consider the pay ratio of politicians relative to conventional labor. Given equations
(6), this ratio can be expressed as:
wg()
wl()
=
l
g
; (10)
where the market-clearing l and g are given in (8). This leads to our third hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3 (Pay Ratio): The pay ratio of politicians relative to conventional labor wg()=wl()
increases in  and exceeds 1 when  > kg=kl.
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This prediction suggests that a greater relative importance of political capital leads to a
relatively greater pay to political capital.
Finally, we briey discuss the cuto¤ productivities of successful matches. This will help
explain the empirical observation that while nearly all rms have some level of conventional
human capital, only a fraction of them (35 percent in our data) is matched with politicians. Let
l and g denote, respectively, the productivities of rms matched with the minimum human
capital abilities al and ag. We have l = a
 1
l (al) and g = a
 1
g (ag), where al(:) and al(:) are
dened in equations (6). Comparing l and g suggests that when ga
g
g > la
l
l , rms will be
sorted to three groups. Firms with  <l will not be matched with any human capital. Firms
with l <  <g are matched with one unit of conventional labor whose ability exceeds al but
are not assigned to any politicians. Firms for which  >g are matched with both a unit of
conventional labor and a unit of politician.
4.5 Discussion
Finally, we make two additional remarks about our results. While we do not intend to exploit
these remarks empirically in the paper, we believe they convey noteworthy implications. First,
we note that, given the setting of the model, the positive assortative matching derived above
is also the e¢ cient matching that maximizes the total output of all matches. This is a direct
application of Koopmans and Beckmanns (1957) theorem of equivalence between the e¢ cient
matching, which maximizes the sum of output among all feasible pairwise matches, and the com-
petitive equilibrium matching, which obtains when each rm takes as given wage rate schedules
and choose the labor abilities that maximize its output. That said, one should, however, note
that competitive matching can be ine¢ cient in the presence of frictions in the matching market
(see, Legros and Newman, 2002). Furthermore, the matching of rms and political capital can
result in social costs such as distortion in labors incentive to raise conventional human capital
ability.
The second notable implication of our results concerns rm performance. While the assign-
ment between rms and human capital is predicted to improve individual rmsperformance,
it raises the dispersion of rm performance. This can be seen by considering the distribution
function of r(). With random matching between  and labor abilities, the dispersion rate of
r() is z where z is the shape parameter of rm productivity distribution. With the positive
assortative matching, the dispersion rate of r() rises to [1+(g+l)="]z. The least e¢ cient
rms can eventually be forced to exit reducing the degree of competition.
5 Data and Variable Construction
We use a Chinese rm-director level panel dataset to examine the theoretical hypotheses in
Section 4. The data includes all the public companies incorporated in the Peoples Republic
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of China. Because state- and privately-controlled companies are still distinctive in corporate
governance and the extent of government intervention (Section 2.1), we focus on rms that do
not have any government entity ownership. We obtain each rms ownership information from
the China Stock Market & Accounting Research (CSMAR) database. This helps us examine
the hiring decision in a prot-seeking environment and ensure that the estimated relationship
between rm productivity and political ability reects an outcome jointly determined by the
producer and political labor markets, rather than a selection by the government. There are
approximately 1200 rms in the data during the period of 2004-2007. The dataset consists of
two parts. We discuss each part in great detail below and describe how we construct the main
variables.
5.1 Director heterogeneity
The rst part of the dataset is structured at rm-director-year level.18 The data reports the
name, detailed biography, education, starting date and compensation of all the executives and
board members associated with the publicly listed companies between 2004 and 2007.19 The
ling of these information is required by China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) and
is supplied by CSMAR.
There are in total 36,308 individuals and 89,608 observations in the data. For each individ-
ual, the data reports a detailed biography. The biography is organized in the format required
by the CSRC and describes each individuals education level, previous work experience, and
previous government positions. We carefully examined each biography and identied all the
political positions previously held by each individual. For each identied position, we classify
the rank of the position in Chinese political hierarchy (see Table A.1). A position is ranked
as 3 if it is at the level of "Bu". This includes provincial Party Secretaries, governors as well
as ministers of State Council ministries and commissions. We rank a position as 2 if it is at
the level of "Ting", which includes municipal-level positions (such as mayors) and department
heads of government bureaus. The lowest rank that is taken into account is "Chu" and takes the
value of 1. It includes county-level positions and directors of government divisions.20 We also
considered alternative weighting schemes, such as including only the highest ranks and allowing
for a nonlinear e¤ect, and found the results largely similar.
As described in Section 1, the number and composition of participating politicians varies
18We use the term director loosely in the paper and refer to both executives and board members. We considered
distinguishing the two by taking into account only executives or board members. The results were qualitatively
similar. In Section 7 where we examine the compensation, we focus exclusively on executives.
19The monetary compensation reported in the data is the sum of salary and bonuses. In addition to monetary
compensation, the data also reports the number of shares owned by each director. There are, however, many
missing values in this information, which leads us to focus on the former in the empirical analysis.
20We focus on bureaucratic ranks at or above "Chu" and do not take into account o¢ cials ranked at "Ke"
(i.e., section chief of government bureau, township party secretary and magistrate). "Ke" is the lowest level of
political hierarchy and considered to have the minimum power. Classifying this rank also requires considerable
judgement.
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over time. Table A.2 shows that the number of politicians engaging in the private sector in our
data was 878 in 2004. The gure decreased to 660 in 2005 but increased to 793 in 2007. Within
the pool of politicians, there is an increasing trend in the political power. Approximately 13
percent of participating politicians in 2004 was at the level of "Bu" (the top tier of hierarchy);
this group increased to 19 percent in 2007.
In addition to the level of political positions, we identied the number of political positions
held by each individual and computed the average rank of the positions. We use these two
as alternative measures of political strength. As shown in Table A.3, there is a large positive
correlation between the level of political rank and the number of previous positions. Individuals
with a higher political rank tend to have held a larger number of positions. This is consistent
with the political system in China, where o¢ cials generally start at lower levels and are gradually
promoted based on their political performance.
To measure conventional human capital, we take into account each individuals education
and professional qualication. We measure education based on the highest degree earned.
This variable ranges from 1 to 5, with the values corresponding to, from low to high, no high
school degree, high school, college, masters and doctoral degree.21 The data shows there
is little correlation between education and political endowment (Table A.3). Among all the
employed directors, people with stronger political capital do not appear to have received more
education. In addition to education, we also observe each persons professional credentials and
titles. A variety of common credentials and titles is considered, including, for example, Certied
Public Accountant (CPA), Chartered Financial Analyst (CFA), Economist and Engineer.22 We
use a dummy variable to represent these professional qualications. Table 1 summarizes the
descriptive statistics of all the director-level variables.
Finally, we take advantage of the panel nature of the data and separately identify new and
existing hires in each company and each year. This information helps us establish the causal
e¤ect of rms performance in a lagged period on their hiring decisions. The data records
signicant turnovers. The average number of newly hired directors is around 6.8. More than
20 percent of the companies have recruited at least one politician between 2005 and 2007.
Now we construct the dependent variable of the matching equation  the political ability
matched to each rm (ag). Specically, we assume that ag = exp(sg) where sg is a discrete
variable representing the political strength of directors and consists of ve alternative measures.
The most basic is an indicator that equals 1 if the rm recruited at least one former politician
and 0 otherwise. Alternatively, we count the number of politicians recruited by each rm. We
also construct three measures to take into account politiciansdi¤erential political strength. The
rst is the average highest political rank held by directors. The second is the average number
21There are some missing values in the education variable. This led to a smaller number of observations
whenever education was included in the estimation.
22Professional credentials and titles are extremely popular in the Chinese labor market and often viewed as
requisite for obtaining professional positions and promotion.
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of political positions, which we use to measure the scope of political connections. The last is
the average rank of previous positions. We essentially assume that the political ability matched
to each rm increases exponentially with its directorsaverage political rank and scope.23 To
capture rmspreference for conventional human capital, we obtain the average education and
professional qualication of directors and denote them as sl. Similarly, we assume al = exp(sl) .
5.2 Firm heterogeneity
The second part of the dataset includes the nancial, location and ownership information of
each rm. The nancial section of the data is obtained from COMPUSTAT24 and company
annual reports and covers the period of 2003-2007.25 It includes information such as sales,
employment, investment, and capital stock.26
We estimate rm productivity based on these information. A two-step semiparametric
procedure is adopted. First, we use the methodology outlined in Olley and Pakes (1996) and
estimate each rms total factor productivity (denoted as bit). This measures each rms overall
e¢ ciency, which, according to our model, consists of two components: the ability of existing
directors (al and ag) and the rms physical e¢ ciency (). In the second stage, we use bit
and information of al;it and ag;it to retrieve estimates of it. This way we isolate the e¤ect of
past recruitment on future hiring decision and focus on the role of rm physical e¢ ciency in
matching. To do so, we regress estimates of TFP, i.e., lnbit, on ln al;it and ln ag;it and consider:27
lnbit = 0 + 1 ln al;it + 2 ln ag;it + "it: (11)
The residuals of the above equation, "it, measure the part of TFP that is not explained by
the ability of current directors, but rather the quality of physical capital (e.g., machinery and
technology), intermediate inputs, and etc., and thus serve as a proxy for ln it. However, since
al;it and ag;it are decisions made based on rm e¢ ciency, the simple OLS parameters will not be
consistent. We thus invoke the method considered in Olley and Pakes (1996) and assume that
"it follows a rst-order Markov process and that al;it and ag;it do not immediately respond to
the innovation in productivity over last periods expectation, i.e., "it E["itj"it 1]. This allows
us to consistently estimate the parameters of ln al;it and ln ag;it by regressing lnbi on ln al;it and
ln ag;it and a consistent estimate of "it:
lnbit = 0 + 1 ln al;it + 2 ln ag;it + E["itj"it 1] + it: (12)
23We also considered alternative functional forms and found the results largely robust.
24COMPUSTAT is a global database of nancial and market information on publicly listed companies. It
covers approximately 98% of the worlds market capitalization.
25Financial data earlier than 2003 contain many missing values, especially for employment.
26Empolyment data in the COMPUSTAT is largely missing for Chinese rms. We manually collected these
data from published annal reports. The nal sample of rms is determined by the availability of the data.
27We also included city-year and industry xed e¤ect to control for the e¤ect of geographic and sectoral factors.
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From the above regression, we obtain lnbit = lnbit   b1 ln al;it   b2 ln ag;it which we use in the
empirical analysis to examine the role of rm physical productivity in future matching with
politicians.28 A two-year time lag is included between rm e¢ ciency and hiring decisions.29
6 The Matching of Heterogeneous Firms, Human Capital and
Politicians
Now we turn to the empirical analysis. We proceed by rst examining the positive assortative
matching and the ability ratio hypotheses, i.e., hypotheses 1-2. We consider the prediction
on pay ratio in Section 7. Specically, we take natural logs of equations (6) and obtain the
following rst empirical specication:
ln ag() = 0g + 1g ln 
ln al() = 0l + 1l ln ; (13)
where ln ag() = sg() and ln al() = sl() measure the political and conventional human capital
abilities matched to each rm, 0g, 1g, 0l and 1l, summarize all the other parameters of
equations (6), such as , , A, n and g, and are controlled for with a series of xed e¤ects,
e.g., city-year and industry (at SIC 3 digit level) dummies.30 Hypothesis 1 predicts that 1g > 0
and 1l > 0. Alternatively, we substitute rm revenue r() for rm e¢ ciency  as equations
(5) predict a similar sorting between rm size and labor abilities.
We then investigate the second hypothesis of Section 4, which predicts the ability ratio
ag()=al() to increase in  when g < l and in . Since the e¤ect of  will be likely controlled
for by the xed e¤ects, we interact rm e¢ ciency with proxies of  when that is the case and
consider the following specication obtained by taking natural logs of equation (9):
ln
ag()
al()
= 0gl + 1gl ln  + 2gl ln  ln : (14)
Hypothesis 2 predicts that 1gl + 2gl ln > 0 if g < l and 2gl > 0.
28We also considered alternative measures of productivity such as a simple labor productivity and the market
share of each rm. The results were qualitatively similar.
29The length of the time lag is determined by the availability of nancial data. While the time lag mitigates
the concern of potential endogeneity, we further address the issue in Section 6.4 using an instrumental variable
(IV) approach.
30 In Section 7 where we examine individual compensation, we include a rm-year xed e¤ect to control for all
time-variant rm characteristics and rely on only within-rm variation to explain the e¤ect of political ability on
director pay. Ideally, we would also like to adopt a rm xed e¤ect (instead of industry dummies) in Section 6.
However, given the relative infrequency of director hiring, rm dummies would substantially reduce the degrees
of freedom.
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6.1 The positive assortative matching hypothesis
Table 3 reports the estimation results of specication (13) using the total stock of directors.
As described in Section 5, we consider ve measures of political capital, ranging from the basic
dummy and count variables to measures that take into account the heterogeneous strength of
politicians. We nd signicant evidence of positive assortative matching between rm physical
e¢ ciency and director political strength. First, there is a positive and statistically signicant
relationship between rm productivity and the probability of having politicians on board. Col-
umn (1) of Table 3 indicates that a 100-percent increase in productivity is associated with 28
percentage points increase in the likelihood of employing a politician.31 The ability of politi-
cians is also stronger in more productive rms as suggested by columns (3)-(5). The average
rank of directors is 0.65 higher in rms with twice the productivity.
Table 3 also indicates positive assortative matching between rm productivity and conven-
tional human capital ability. More productive rms tend to have directors with higher education
and professional qualication.
[Table 3 about here]
Next, instead of looking at the stock of directors we examine the inow of political and
conventional human capital by considering only new hires. This helps address the possibility of
reverse causality between rm productivity and director abilities. Table 4 reports the estimates.
The dependent variables are constructed using newly hired directors only.32 Again, we nd
signicant evidence of positive assortative matching for politicians. More productive rms
are signicantly more likely to recruit politically endowed individuals than their less e¢ cient
counterparts. They also tend to be matched with politicians from the higher level of hierarchy
and those that held a larger number of positions. The average political rank of new directors
increases by a half rank when rm productivity rises by 100 percent. New hires recruited by
the top 90th percentile rms are on average ranked at the level of "Chu" (the equivalent of
county magistrates), nearly twice as much as those in the bottom 10th percentile. The above
positive matching similarly applies to the directorsprofessional qualication. Firms with a
higher productivity have a signicantly stronger preference for individuals with professional
credentials. However, the relationship between rm productivity and director education level
becomes insignicant.
[Table 4 about here]
In Table 5, we examine the matching between rm revenue and director abilities. As
expected from Section 4, we nd rms with a larger revenue are matched with higher political
31The results in column (1) are obtained based on a linear probability (LP) model. We use LP models to
avoid the incidental parameter problem that would arise in xed-e¤ect maximum-likelihood estimators. Recall
two sets of xed e¤ects are employed in our estimations to control for the e¤ect of unobserved characteristics.
32Firms that did not have any new hires are not included in the analysis.
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ability. Directors recruited by the larger companies are not only more powerful in terms of
bureaucratic rank but also more experienced in terms of the number of held positions. Similar
to Table 4, there is a positive correlation between rm revenue and new hires professional
qualication even though the correlation with education remains insignicant.
[Tables 5 about here]
6.2 The ability ratio hypothesis
Now we proceed to the second hypothesis of Section 4 and examine whether more productive
rms exhibit a higher political to conventional labor ability ratio, especially when the relative
importance of political capital captured in  is high. To do so, we consider various measures
of  which can a¤ect the role of political capital in rm operation. These measures include
dependence on external nance, foreign ownership and local governance quality. We discuss
below how each of these factors a¤ects the relative value of politicians and consequently rms
preference between political and conventional human capital.
6.2.1 Dependence on external nance
As discussed in Section 2.1, a cross-country survey conducted by Batra et al. (2003) reports
that rms in China are among the most constrained in the world in terms of access to capital.
The level of nancial constraints reported by Chinese entrepreneurs is similar to those prevailing
in other transitional economies such as Czech Republic and Romania and poor economies such
as Ghana and Ethiopia. Similar conclusions have been reached by surveys organized by the
Chinese government. A research report based on a private-sector survey conducted in 2002
concludes that nancing continues to be a major challenge for many private rms. This nding
is not surprising given the controlled nancial system in China. Even with the entrance and
growth of many domestic and foreign banks and nancial institutions in recent years, Chinas
banking system is still mainly dominated by the four largest state-owned banks, i.e., Bank of
China, Peoples Construction Bank of China, Agricultural Bank of China, and Industrial and
Commercial Bank of China. According to Allen et al. (2008), around 30 percent of publicly
listed companiesfunding comes from bank loans; about 45 percent comes from self-fund raising,
including internal nancing and proceeds from equity and bond issuance. The lack of access
to long-term capital and the resulting high dependence on self-fund raising constitutes a large
impediment to business growth. An e¤ective approach to overcome this impediment is to build
political connections.
We hence consider next how the ratio of political capital ability relative to conventional
human capital varies across rms dependent on their demand for external nance. We consider
two measures. First, we use a simple capital-labor ratio. We identify, for each industry, the
median rms capital-labor ratio where capital is measured by the tangible xed asset value and
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labor the size of employment. Second, we construct an industry specic measure of external
capital dependence following the approach of Braun (2003). This variable is measured for each
industry by the median rms share of capital expenditure that is not nanced with cash ow
from operation. Both of these variables are constructed based on all publicly listed companies.
We interact these variables with rm productivity respectively and estimate specication (14).
Tables 6 and 7 report the estimates. The evidence is broadly consistent with the expectation.
We nd that more productive rms tend to have a higher ratio of political ability relative
to conventional human capital ability. This is especially true for rms in capital intensive
industries and industries with a larger external capital dependence. This nding suggests that
raising rmscapital access is a value exclusive to political investment; it increases rmsrelative
preference for political capital as compared to traditional human capital.
[Tables 6-7 about here]
6.2.2 Foreign ownership
In this sub-section, we examine how the relative importance of political capital in rm production
can vary between foreign and domestically owned rms. Companies with foreign ownership may
di¤er from domestic rms in three ways. First, rms with foreign ownership enjoy more favorable
treatments from central and local governments. Haggard and Huang (2008) point out that
since China became open to foreign direct investment, it has established a preferential regime
for overseas investors. The preferential treatment includes moderate taxes and concessionary
terms on land rental and utility rate. Second, rms with foreign ownership are less dependent
on access to local bank loans. They rely more on funds from foreign investors as a main source
of nancing. Both of the above factors lower the marginal return of political investment and
consequently the incentive to invest in political capital. However, foreign owned rms also tend
to have less knowledge about government regulations and often experience a greater di¢ culty
in navigating the complex institutional environment. Survey evidence presented in Rosen
(1999), for example, suggests that Western investors in China are challenged by administrative
di¢ culties and operational ine¢ ciencies. They also are deterred in some cases by the lack of
transparency and oversight. These attributes predict a stronger incentive to build political
connections.
To test the above hypotheses, we include in Table 8 an indicator variable that equals 1 if
the rm has more than 10 percent foreign ownership. The estimates suggest that rms with a
signicant foreign ownership have a lower ratio of political capital ability than their host-country
domestic counterparts. This result lends support to the rst two hypotheses where foreign owned
rms are predicted to derive less benet from employing politicians given the level of preference
they already receive and the relatively lower level of dependence on host-country nancing.
[Table 8 about here]
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6.2.3 Local governance quality
As described in Section 2, local government o¢ cials in China retain a large degree of discretion
after the administrative decentralization. For example, every investment contract has to be
approved by some government level: provinces and economic zones have the authority to approve
projects valued up to $30 million; county governments are able to approve projects below $10
million. Local governments are also responsible for enforcing national regulations such as the
protection of intellectual property rights.
This decentralization led to a large dispersion in governance quality across administrative
units. A recent survey conducted by the World Bank (2006) in 120 Chinese cities nds a
signicant geographic di¤erence in institutional environment. Given the uniform rule of law,
this di¤erence was attributed to the varying governance quality across regions. For exam-
ple, the statistics show that in the top 90th percentile cities, the average number of days of
dealing with municipal government is around 36 per year, whereas rms in the bottom 10th
percentile cities spend on average 87 days. There is also a substantial di¤erence in companies
expenditure on entertainment, a variable that has been considered by studies such as Cai et al.
(2009) as a measure of corruption. In cities of the top 90th percentile, entertainment expen-
diture constitutes 0.7 percent of revenue. Firms located in the bottom 10th percentile cities
spend 1.7 times more. Based on these considerations, six cities, including Hangzhou, Qingdao,
Shaoxing, Suzhou, Xiamen and Yantai, were evaluated to have a relatively superior institutional
environment.
In this subsection, we investigate how geographic variation in governance quality a¤ects the
relative importance of political capital in rm operation and consequently the incentive to invest
in political capital. We use the number of days dealing with governments available at the city
level as a measure of government ine¢ ciency and interact it with rm productivity.33 Table
9 reports the estimation results of specication (14). We nd that the degree of governance
ine¢ ciency exerts a signicant e¤ect on rmsincentive to recruit capable politicians as opposed
to traditional human capital. At each productivity level, rms located in cities with more
ine¢ cient governments are matched with a signicantly higher ratio of political capital ability.
[Table 9 about here]
6.3 Alternative explanation: extortion
In the above sections, we have interpreted our ndings as evidence of positive assortative match-
ing between rms and politicians. Now we examine whether there is an alternative interpre-
tation that can plausibly explain these ndings. The most likely alternative interpretation of
our results would be a story of "extortion". In this explanation, the positive assignment we
33Note we already include city-year xed e¤ect in the estimations. We also considered rmsaverage expen-
diture on entertainment and condence on contractual enforcement as alternative measures. The results were
similar.
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found empirically would be interpreted not as a mutually benecial match but rather the self
imposition by politicians. This argument relies on three assumptions. First, politicians possess
the power of imposing themselves on non-state controlled rms. Second, rms do not derive any
benets from political connections. Finally, more powerful politicians would select the more
productive and hence more protable rms.
The rst two assumptions are largely unlikely given the current institutional environment
in China. As discussed in Section 2, with the proliferation of privatization, the direct inuence
of government o¢ cials on non-state controlled businesses has diminished substantially. These
assumptions are also inconsistent with our results in Section 6.2. We found that the positive
assignment between rm productivity and political ability is particularly strong for industries
with high external nance dependence and cities with high government ine¢ ciency. These
results suggest that rms are more likely to match with politicians, especially those from the
higher level of politician hierarchy, when there is likely a greater demand for political capital.
If rms did not derive any benets from political connections and the match is driven com-
pletely by politicians selecting and extracting rents from the most protable rms, the matching
mechanism would not vary across industries or locations in a systematic manner. More power-
ful politicians would simply pick the more protable rms without giving any attention to the
nancial constraint faced by the rms.
6.4 The potential endogeneity of productivity
So far, we have examined the e¤ect of lagged productivity on rmsdecisions to invest in political
and conventional human capital. The use of a time lag between rm attribute and investment
decision helps establish the causal e¤ect. Nonetheless, there still can be concerns of potential
endogeneity in the estimated parameter of productivity due to, for example, omitted variables
or reverse causality.
To address this concern, we employ in this subsection an instrumental variable (IV) approach.
Plausible instruments in this case include the average productivities of upstream and downstream
rms located in the same geographic region. The choice of these instruments is motivated
by the growing economics literature on technology spillover, including the recent studies by
Javorcik (2004), Haskel et al. (2007), and Keller and Yeaple (2007).34 Javorcik (2004), for
example, nds signicant evidence of productivity spillover through backward linkage between
foreign multinational and domestic rms. She shows that high productivity in downstream
industries raises the productivity of upstream rms. In light of these ndings, we construct two
identication groups for each Chinese rm in the sample: (i) rms from upstream industries
and located in the same province; (ii) rms from downstream industries and the same province.
34The majority of the above studies focus on the technology spillovers from foreign MNCs to domestic rms.
For our purpose here, we consider all the rms producing in China as a potential source of spillover without
distinguishing the structure of their ownership.
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We compute the (input-output coe¢ cient) weighted average productivity of each group and use
them as the instruments.
We include both public and private rms in the IV construction. Data of private rms
is obtained from Oriana, a comprehensive database containing nancial information of public
and private companies in over 30 countries including the Middle East and Asia-Pacic regions
such as China. Based on this database, we obtain each rms basic nancial and industry
information and calculate their productivity.35 The input-output table used to compute the
weighted average is taken from the OECD input-output database.
Similar to the literature, we nd evidence of productivity spillover between vertically linked
industries. The productivity of local downstream industries is positively correlated with up-
stream rmse¢ ciency. Similar is true for forward linkage: more productive upstream suppliers
raise the productivity of downstream rms. Correcting for the potential endogeneity of pro-
ductivity does not, however, change the matching of rms and politicians. As shown in Table
10, more productive rms continue to exhibit a stronger incentive to invest in political capital.
[Table 10 about here]
7 The Price of Political Capital: The Pay Ratio Hypothesis
After examining the matching of rms and politicians, we ask next: What is the relative price
of political capital as compared to conventional human capital? Recall hypothesis 3 of Section
4 predicts that the pay ratio of politicians relative to traditional labor increases in the relative
importance of political capital  and exceeds 1 when  is su¢ ciently large.
We test this hypothesis by considering the log form of equation (10).
ln

wg()
wl()

= 0w + 1w ln: (15)
where 1w is expected to be positive and 0w + 1w ln > 0 means that politicians receive a
greater pay than their non-political co-workers. Let dg denote an indicator variable that equals
1 if a director has previously held political positions and 0 otherwise. We can rewrite the above
equation to:
lnw() = (0w + 1w ln) dg + 2w ln al + (); (16)
where w() is the level of compensation o¤ered to each director by each company (observed at
rm-director-year level)36, al includes conventional human characteristics, and () represents
35Given the large number of missing values in capital and investment information, we use labor productivity
as a proxy for e¢ ciency.
36We focus here on the pay received by executives. Furthermore, we di¤erentiate the di¤erent levels of executives
by either including either a position xed e¤ect (e.g., separate dummy variables for CEO, senior managers and
etc.) or restricting the data to a certain position such as top executive like CEO or general manager. Results
obtained based on the former are reported here.
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a vector of rm-year dummies and controls for all time-variant rm-level characteristics. This
specication controls for the nonrandom matching between rms and human capital (including
political human capital). It essentially estimates the price premium of political capital, i.e.,
0w + 1w ln, based exclusively on within-rm variation.37 Alternatively, we can replace dg
with political ability ag to estimate the marginal e¤ect of political ability.
We begin by rst including the entire sample of executives, without di¤erentiating existing
and new hires. Table 11 reports the results. We nd that politicians receive signicantly greater
compensation than their non-political co-workers as indicated by the positive and statistically
signicant parameter of the politician indicator. The pay gap is around 10 percent and is
especially large for rms in industries with higher external nance dependence, as expected
from hypothesis 3 in Section 4. Firms located in cities with higher government ine¢ ciency also
tend to o¤er a greater pay premium to politically endowed directors.
In the last four columns of Table 11, we replace the politician indicator variable with the
political rank. The results indicate that a one-step increase in political rank leads to, on
average, 6 percent increase in annual pay though the magnitude of the e¤ect varies with the
level of political rank. This exceeds the marginal e¤ect of raising education attainment by one
tier (e.g., from college to master degree) and obtaining professional credential.
[Table 11 about here]
Now we restrict the sample to new hires. This further mitigates the potential concern of
correlation between the main explanatory variables and residuals, which can arise among existing
directors. Table 12 reports the results. We nd that newly hired directors with political capital
receive signicantly more pay than their colleagues in the same cohort. A one-step increase in
political ladder leads to 7 percent increase in the compensation o¤er. When we di¤erentiate
the political ranks, we note that a one-step rise from Chu (third rank) to Ting (second rank)
or from Ting to Bu (rst rank) results in 12 percent more pay. This implies a pay premium
of approximately US$5800. The e¤ect of education attainment, on the other hand, appears
insignicant.
[Table 12 about here]
8 Conclusion
Politician recruiting is an increasingly common phenomenon in China since the great economic
transformation. It was exacerbated as the country undertook a sequence of bureaucratic reforms
 raising the supply of local politicians  and a privatization process that led to a growing
demand for political connections.
37The inclusion of rm-year xed e¤ect also means that rm characteristics, including productivity and foreign
ownership, will drop out of the estimations.
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We investigate in this paper how the di¤erential decisions of rms to engage in political
investment lead to a positive assortative matching of rms and politicians. We also examine how
the matching mechanism in the political capital markets compares to the matching in traditional
labor markets. Our results indicate that more productive rms are consistently more likely
to hire politically endowed individuals than their less e¢ cient competitors. They also tend to
recruit politicians from a higher level of political hierarchy as suggested by the positive matching
hypothesis of the model. The preference for political capital ability relative to conventional
human capital increases in rmsdependence on external nancing and the level of government
ine¢ ciency, but decreases in the extent of foreign ownership. We argue that these results o¤er
evidence of mutually benecial matching rather than alternative explanations such as extortion.
The possibility that the matches are driven completely by politiciansself imposition on the most
protable rms is unlikely given that rms with greater nancial constraints clearly employ more
and stronger politicians. The assortative matching remains robust when we address the potential
endogeneity of productivity using an IV approach and employing the average productivities of
upstream and downstream rms located in the same province as identifying instruments.
In addition to the endogenous matching, we examine the relative price of political capital in
comparison to conventional human capital. We nd that directors with political endowment
receive signicantly more compensation than their co-workers. The political premium increases
in the level of political strength and the potential importance of political capital. A one-step
increase in the political ladder from, for example, municipal to provincial level leads to 12 percent
more pay. Education attainment, on the other hand, appears to a¤ect the compensation of
existing directors only.
Our analysis conveys a number of broad implications. First, our results indicate that
there is a signicant variation, even within each industry, in the decisions to engage in political
investment. Second, by introducing heterogeneity in factor markets including the markets
of political labor, our paper helps identify potential sources of rm heterogeneity in overall
e¢ ciency. The role of political capital matching as a potential source of overall heterogeneity is
particularly important in economies with under-developed institutional environment. Finally,
our nding of positive assortative matching between rms and politicians suggests that the
extent of rm dispersion in performance can be further widened as a result of political market
assignment.
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Table 1: Summary statistics of director-level variables
Variables Denition Mean Std. Min Max
Politician dummy An indicator that equals 1 if the executive 0.03 0.18 0 1
held a political position and 0 otherwise
Max rank The highest political rank held by the 0.07 0.38 0 3
executive
Number of posts The number of political positions held by 0.04 0.22 0 6
the executive
Ave. rank The average political rank held by the 0.07 0.37 0 3
executive
Education The level of education of the executive 3.12 0.71 1 5
Pro. Qualication An indicator that equals 1 if the executive 0.32 0.46 0 1
has a professional credential or title
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Table 2: Summary statistics of rm variables
Variables Denition Mean Std. Min Max
Existing stock
Politician dummy An indicator that equals 1 if there is at 0.37 0.48 0 1
least one politician and 0 otherwise
Politician count The number of politicians on board 0.61 1.06 0 11
Max rank The average of the highest rank held 0.76 1.02 0 3
by the politicians
Num. of posts The average number of political 0.42 0.59 0 4
positions held by the politicians
Ave. rank The average rank of political positions 0.74 1.00 0 3
held by the politicians
Ave. education The average education level of 3.16 0.37 1.57 5
executives
Ave. qualication The percentage of executives with 0.31 0.28 0 1
professional credential
New hires
Politician dummy An indicator that equals 1 if there is at 0.20 0.40 0 1
least one politician and 0 otherwise
Politician count The number of politicians 0.31 0.76 0 9
Max rank The average of the highest rank held 0.42 0.85 0 3
by the politicians
Num. of posts The average number of political 0.24 0.51 0 5
positions held by the politicians
Ave. rank The average rank of political positions 0.07 0.23 0 3
held by the politicians
Ave. education The average education level of 3.17 0.40 1 5
executives
Ave. qualication The percentage of executives with 0.31 0.34 0 1
professional credential
Firm attributes
Firm productivity Estimated physical productivity 1.39 0.24 -0.30 2.09
(in log)
33
Table 3: The matching of rms, politicians and conventional human capital
Political Capital Human Capital
Dependent (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
variables: Dummy Count Max rank Posts Ave. rank Educ. Qualif.
Productivity 0.28*** 0.80*** 0.65** 0.28*** 0.65*** 0.08** 0.16***
(0.05) (0.15) (0.12) (0.06) (0.12) (0.04) (0.03)
City-year fe yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Ind. fe yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Num. of obs. 4054 4054 4054 4054 4054 3611 4054
R square 0.42 0.50 0.42 0.43 0.42 0.44 0.46
Root MSE 0.44 0.94 0.94 0.54 0.93 0.31 0.26
Notes: (i) robust standard errors are reported in the parentheses; (ii) ***, ** and *
represent statistical signicance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
Table 4: The matching of rms, politicians and conventional human capital: new hires
Political Capital Human Capital
Dependent (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
variables: Dummy Count Max rank Posts Ave. rank Educ. Qualif.
Productivity 0.18*** 0.31*** 0.46*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.09 0.14***
(0.05) (0.12) (0.12) (0.03) (0.03) (0.08) (0.04)
City-year fe yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Ind. fe yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Num. of obs. 2952 2952 2952 2952 2952 2095 2952
R square 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.43 0.44 0.48 0.45
Root MSE 0.38 0.73 0.83 0.22 0.22 0.38 0.32
Notes: (i) robust standard errors are reported in the parentheses; (ii) ***, ** and *
represent statistical signicance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
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Table 5: The matching of rms, politicians and conventional human capital: rm revenue and
new hires
Political Capital Human Capital
Dependent (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
variables: Dummy Count Max rank Posts Ave. rank Educ. Qualif.
Revenue 0.01*** 0.03** 0.04*** 0.02** 0.01* 0.01 0.01***
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
City-year fe yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Ind. fe yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Num. of obs. 3293 3293 3293 3293 3293 2337 3293
R square 0.39 0.41 0.38 0.40 0.41 0.47 0.43
Root MSE 0.38 0.69 0.83 0.48 0.22 0.38 0.32
Notes: (i) robust standard errors are reported in the parentheses; (ii) ***, ** and *
represent statistical signicance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
Table 6: The ability ratio: the e¤ect of capital intensity
Dependent variable: Political / Human Capital Ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Political  Max rank Posts Max rank Posts
Human capital  Education Education Qualif. Qualif.
Productivity 0.30* 0.08 0.31*** 0.06
(0.17) (0.12) (0.12) (0.07)
 Capital-labor ratio 0.02*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
City-year fe yes yes yes yes
Ind. fe yes yes yes yes
Num. of obs. 2095 2095 2095 2095
R square 0.46 0.47 0.40 0.39
Root MSE 0.98 0.66 0.86 0.56
Notes: (i) robust standard errors are reported in the parentheses; (ii) ***, **
and * represent statistical signicance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
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Table 7: The ability ratio: the e¤ect of external nance dependence
Dependent variable: Political / Human Capital Ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Political  Max rank Posts Max rank Posts
Human capital  Educ. Educ. Qualif. Qualif.
Productivity 0.33*** 0.11 0.28*** 0.04
(0.18) (0.12) (0.12) (0.07)
 External nance dep. 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.03***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
City-year fe yes yes yes yes
Ind. fe yes yes yes yes
Num. of obs. 2095 2095 2095 2095
R square 0.46 0.47 0.40 0.40
Root MSE 0.98 0.66 0.86 0.56
Notes: (i) robust standard errors are reported in the parentheses; (ii) ***, **
and * represent statistical signicance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
Table 8: The ability ratio: the e¤ect of foreign ownership
Dependent variable: Political / Human Capital Ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Political  Max rank Posts Max rank Posts
Human capital  Educ. Educ. Qualif. Qualif.
Productivity 0.34** 0.10* 0.32*** 0.07*
(0.17) (0.05) (0.12) (0.03)
Foreign ownership ind. -0.49* -0.26 -0.41*** -0.25**
(0.31) (0.22) (0.17) (0.11)
City-year fe yes yes yes yes
Ind. fe yes yes yes yes
Num. of obs. 2095 2095 2095 2095
R square 0.46 0.47 0.40 0.40
Root MSE 0.99 0.66 0.86 0.56
Notes: (i) robust standard errors are reported in the parentheses; (ii) ***, **
and * represent statistical signicance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
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Table 9: The ability ratio: the e¤ect of government ine¢ ciency
Dependent variable: Political / Human Capital Ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Political  Max rank Posts Max rank Posts
Human capital  Educ. Educ. Qualif. Qualif.
Productivity -1.11* -1.06*** -0.54 -0.46*
(0.64) (0.47) (0.40) (0.27)
 Govt. ine¢ ciency 30.14*** 23.88*** 18.29*** 11.21**
(12.19) (8.68) (8.00) (5.35)
City-year fe yes yes yes yes
Ind. fe yes yes yes yes
Num. of obs. 2095 2095 2095 2095
R square 0.34 0.35 0.26 0.25
Root MSE 1.00 0.67 0.87 0.56
Notes: (i) robust standard errors are reported in the parentheses; (ii) ***, **
and * represent statistical signicance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
Table 10: The matching of rm productivity and political ability of new hires: correcting for
potential endogeneity of productivity
Political Capital Human Capital
Dependent (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
variables: Dummy Count Max rank Posts Ave. rank Educ. Qualif.
Productivity 0.20*** 0.34*** 0.48*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.10 0.16***
(0.06) (0.12) (0.14) (0.03) (0.03) (0.08) (0.05)
City-year fe yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Ind. fe yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Num. of obs. 2952 2952 2952 2952 2952 2095 2952
R square 0.43 0.44 0.42 0.41 0.45 0.48 0.46
Root MSE 0.38 0.71 0.83 0.49 0.21 0.38 0.32
Notes: (i) robust standard errors are reported in the parentheses; (ii) ***, ** and *
represent statistical signicance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
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Table 11: The labor price equation: rm-director level (all directors)
Dependent variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Director pay
Politician dummy 0.10*** 0.10*** -0.05
(0.04) (0.04) (0.13)
 External nance dep. 0.02*
(0.01)
 Govt. ine¢ ciency 3.77**
(1.80)
Max rank 0.06*** 0.04* -0.03
(0.02) (0.02) (0.07)
Bu 0.14**
(0.07)
Ting 0.10**
(0.04)
Chu 0.09*
(0.04)
 External nance dep. 0.01*
(0.00)
 Govt. ine¢ ciency 2.02**
(1.02)
Education 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Professional qualif. 0.03*** 0.04*** 0.03** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.04*** 0.03**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Firm-year fe yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Num. of obs. 10,403 10,403 10,403 10,403 10,403 10,403 10,403
R square 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85
Root MSE 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.43
Notes: (i) robust standard errors are reported in the parentheses; (ii) ***, ** and * represent
statistical signicance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
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Table 12: The labor price equation: rm-director level (new hires)
Dependent variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Director pay
Politician dummy 0.13*** 0.07* -0.32
(0.05) (0.04) (0.27)
 External nance dep. 0.08**
(0.03)
 Govt. ine¢ ciency 9.32**
(4.83)
Max rank 0.07*** 0.08* -0.15
(0.02) (0.04) (0.13)
Bu 0.24**
(0.11)
Ting 0.12**
(0.06)
Chu 0.14
(0.11)
 External nance dep. 0.05*
(0.02)
 Govt. ine¢ ciency 4.45**
(2.34)
Education 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Professional qualif. 0.05** 0.04* 0.04 0.05** 0.05** 0.04* 0.03
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Firm-year fe yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Num. of obs. 4162 4162 4162 4162 4162 4162 4162
R square 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.86
Root MSE 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.46
Notes: (i) robust standard errors are reported in the parentheses; (ii) ***, ** and *
represent statistical signicance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
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Table A.1: The political hierarchy in China
Rank Positions
Top leaders General party secretary
President
Chairman of NPC
Premiers, Vice Premiers
State councilors
Bu Minister
Provincial party secretary
Governor
Ting Department head of government bureau
Municipal party secretary
Mayor
Chu Division director of government bureau
County party secretary
County magistrate
Ke Section chief of government bureau
Township party secretary
Township magistrate
Table A.2: The composition of participating politicians
Rank 2004 2005 2006 2007
Count Share Count Share Count Share Count Share
Bu 114 0.13 77 0.12 113 0.16 146 0.19
Ting 689 0.78 531 0.80 531 0.75 581 0.73
Chu 75 0.08 52 0.08 63 0.09 66 0.08
Total 878 1.00 660 1.00 707 1.00 793 1.00
Table A.3: The correlation between political and conventional human
capital abilities
Max rank Num. of posts Ave. rank Education Pro. qualif.
Max rank 1.00
Num. of posts 0.91 1.00
Ave. rank 0.99 0.89 1.00
Education -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 1.00
Pro. qualif. 0.02 0.01 0.02 -0.16 1.00
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